Unlike DirectoryEntry (which is used when constructing directories),
DirectoryEntryView does not manage storage for file names. Names are
just StringViews.
This is much more suited to the directory traversal API and makes
it easier to implement this in file system classes since they no
longer need to create temporary name copies while traversing.
Pledges and Veil state don't really make sense for kernel mode
processes, as they can do what ever they want since they are in
kernel mode. Make this clear in the system monitor UI by marking
these entries as null.
The SI prefixes "k", "M", "G" mean "10^3", "10^6", "10^9".
The IEC prefixes "Ki", "Mi", "Gi" mean "2^10", "2^20", "2^30".
Let's use the correct name, at least in code.
Only changes the name of the constants, no other behavior change.
This would have caused an issue later when we enable -Wmissing-declarations, as
the compiler didn't see that Kernel::all_inodes() was being used elsewhere, too.
Also, this means that if the type changes later, there's not going to be weird
run-time issues, but rather a nice type error during compile time.
This enables a nice warning in case a function becomes dead code. Also, in case
of signal_trampoline_dummy, marking it external (non-static) prevents it from
being 'optimized away', which would lead to surprising and weird linker errors.
I found these places by using -Wmissing-declarations.
The Kernel still shows these issues, which I think are false-positives,
but don't want to touch:
- Kernel/Arch/i386/CPU.cpp:1081:17: void Kernel::enter_thread_context(Kernel::Thread*, Kernel::Thread*)
- Kernel/Arch/i386/CPU.cpp:1170:17: void Kernel::context_first_init(Kernel::Thread*, Kernel::Thread*, Kernel::TrapFrame*)
- Kernel/Arch/i386/CPU.cpp:1304:16: u32 Kernel::do_init_context(Kernel::Thread*, u32)
- Kernel/Arch/i386/CPU.cpp:1347:17: void Kernel::pre_init_finished()
- Kernel/Arch/i386/CPU.cpp:1360:17: void Kernel::post_init_finished()
No idea, not gonna touch it.
- Kernel/init.cpp:104:30: void Kernel::init()
- Kernel/init.cpp:167:30: void Kernel::init_ap(u32, Kernel::Processor*)
- Kernel/init.cpp:184:17: void Kernel::init_finished(u32)
Called by boot.S.
- Kernel/init.cpp:383:16: int Kernel::__cxa_atexit(void (*)(void*), void*, void*)
- Kernel/StdLib.cpp:285:19: void __cxa_pure_virtual()
- Kernel/StdLib.cpp:300:19: void __stack_chk_fail()
- Kernel/StdLib.cpp:305:19: void __stack_chk_fail_local()
Not sure how to tell the compiler that the compiler is already using them.
Also, maybe __cxa_atexit should go into StdLib.cpp?
- Kernel/Modules/TestModule.cpp:31:17: void module_init()
- Kernel/Modules/TestModule.cpp:40:17: void module_fini()
Could maybe go into a new header. This would also provide type-checking for new modules.
This compiles, and fixes two bugs:
- setpgid() confusion (see previous commit)
- tcsetpgrp() now allows to set a non-empty process group even if
the group leader has already died. This makes Serenity slightly
more POSIX-compatible.
This compiles, and contains exactly the same bugs as before.
The regex 'FIXME: PID/' should reveal all markers that I left behind, including:
- Incomplete conversion
- Issues or things that look fishy
- Actual bugs that will go wrong during runtime
In #3001 I was trying to fix result propagation issues, and
I actually just introduced another one. Luckily Ben spotted
it in the diff after it was in the tree, thanks Ben!
This function did a const_cast internally which made the call side look
"safe". This method is removed completely and call sites are replaced
with ByteBuffer::wrap(const_cast<void*>(data), size) which makes the
behaviour obvious.
Certain implementations of Inode::directory_entry_count were calling
functions which returned errors, but had no way of surfacing them.
Switch the return type to KResultOr<size_t> and start observing these
error paths.
Allow passing in an optional timeout to Thread::block and move
the timeout check out of Thread::Blocker. This way all Blockers
implicitly support timeouts and don't need to implement it
themselves. Do however allow them to override timeouts (e.g.
for sockets).
We need to have a Thread lock to protect threading related
operations, such as Thread::m_blocker which is used in
Thread::block.
Also, if a Thread::Blocker indicates that it should be
unblocking immediately, don't actually block the Thread
and instead return immediately in Thread::block.
By making the Process class RefCounted we don't really need
ProcessInspectionHandle anymore. This also fixes some race
conditions where a Process may be deleted while still being
used by ProcFS.
Also make sure to acquire the Process' lock when accessing
regions.
Last but not least, there's no reason why a thread can't be
scheduled while being inspected, though in practice it won't
happen anyway because the scheduler lock is held at the same
time.
To be more in line with other parts of Serenity's procfs, the
"key: value" format of /proc/cpuinfo was replaced with JSON, namely
an array of objects (one for each core).
The available keys remain the same, though "features" has been changed
from a space-separated string to an array of strings.
We now have BlockResult::WokeNormally and BlockResult::NotBlocked,
both of which indicate no error. We can no longer just check for
BlockResult::WokeNormally and assume anything else must be an
interruption.
We can now properly initialize all processors without
crashing by sending SMP IPI messages to synchronize memory
between processors.
We now initialize the APs once we have the scheduler running.
This is so that we can process IPI messages from the other
cores.
Also rework interrupt handling a bit so that it's more of a
1:1 mapping. We need to allocate non-sharable interrupts for
IPIs.
This also fixes the occasional hang/crash because all
CPUs now synchronize memory with each other.
FileBackedFileSystem is one that's backed by (mounted from) a file, in other
words one that has a "source" of the mount; that doesn't mean it deals in
blocks. The hierarchy now becomes:
* FS
* ProcFS
* DevPtsFS
* TmpFS
* FileBackedFS
* (future) Plan9FS
* BlockBasedFS
* Ext2FS
There isn't an easy way to retreive all register contents anymore,
so remove this functionality. We do have the ability to trace
processes, so it shouldn't really be needed anymore.
These APIs were clearly modeled after Ext2FS internals, and make perfect sense
in Ext2FS context. The new APIs are more generic, and map better to the
semantics exported to the userspace, where inode identifiers only appear in
stat() and readdir() output, but never in any input.
This will also hopefully reduce the potential for races (see commit c44b4d61f3).
Lastly, this makes it way more viable to implement a filesystem that only
synthesizes its inodes lazily when queried, and destroys them when they are no
longer in use. With inode identifiers being used to reference inodes, the only
choice for such a filesystem is to persist any inode it has given out the
identifier for, because it might be queried at any later time. With direct
references to inodes, the filesystem will know when the last reference is
dropped and the inode can be safely destroyed.
This fixes a bug where the mode of a FIFO was reported as 001000 instead
of 0010000 (you see the difference? me nethier), and hopefully doesn't
introduce new bugs. I've left 0777 and similar in a few places, because
that is *more* readable than its symbolic version.
Get rid of the weird old signature:
- int StringType::to_int(bool& ok) const
And replace it with sensible new signature:
- Optional<int> StringType::to_int() const
.. and make travis run it.
I renamed check-license-headers.sh to check-style.sh and expanded it so
that it now also checks for the presence of "#pragma once" in .h files.
It also checks the presence of a (single) blank line above and below the
"#pragma once" line.
I also added "#pragma once" to all the files that need it: even the ones
we are not check.
I also added/removed blank lines in order to make the script not fail.
I also ran clang-format on the files I modified.
This adds support for MS_RDONLY, a mount flag that tells the kernel to disallow
any attempts to write to the newly mounted filesystem. As this flag is
per-mount, and different mounts of the same filesystems (such as in case of bind
mounts) can have different mutability settings, you have to go though a custody
to find out if the filesystem is mounted read-only, instead of just asking the
filesystem itself whether it's inherently read-only.
This also adds a lot of checks we were previously missing; and moves some of
them to happen after more specific checks (such as regular permission checks).
One outstanding hole in this system is sys$mprotect(PROT_WRITE), as there's no
way we can know if the original file description this region has been mounted
from had been opened through a readonly mount point. Currently, we always allow
such sys$mprotect() calls to succeed, which effectively allows anyone to
circumvent the effect of MS_RDONLY. We should solve this one way or another.
